Trends Identified
The Role of the State
The state will remain the basic unit in international relations, although it will face challenges and the authority vested in it will vary. Most states will retain authority over the full spectrum of activities, whereas others, such as those in the EU, will voluntarily divest some to regional or supranational authorities. Others, such as some states in Africa, will have little practical authority. Transnational movements and groups will remain influential and are likely to further erode some aspects of state power. The varying levels of authority will complicate the ability of states to achieve and sustain multilateral partnerships and agreements.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
Global Governance
The UN will continue to offer a framework for international discourse. It will continue to be the global service provider, offering international coordination and direction in specific areas through bodies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), UNHCR and United Nations Educational Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The permanent membership of the UN Security Council is likely to expand, but it will struggle to deal with conflict and tension. Other global institutions will face considerable challenges.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
Differing Political Systems
Any assumption that Western liberal values and processes would become the global norm has already been severely challenged. Out to 2040, there will be an era of competing political systems, ranging from liberal democracy through to autocracy and theocracy. Tension between regions, states and nationalist identities, and corruption among ruling elites, are likely to constrain the spread of democracy. Liberal democracies will still dominate in the West. However, the arguments of some democratic movements may not be perceived as strong enough to solve the problems in some developing states that maintain, or turn to, more autocratic or authoritarian political systems. The populations of some states may favour stability, the promise of economic growth and limited de-regulation at the expense of fully representative government. Political systems based on tradition, be it ethnic, tribal or religious, are likely to remain features of the global political system, as are dictatorships.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
Transnational Extremism
Transnational armed criminal, terrorist or insurgent groups, experienced in conflicts around the world will be part of the strategic landscape. Many extreme political groups will have a transnational following, and may increasingly employ sophisticated methods of coercion, including cyber attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They will remain highly unpredictable and a continued cause of tension and instability especially in regions that have underlying governance and economic problems, such as in sub-Saharan Africa and possibly Latin America. Most will demonstrate features associated with organised criminality, terrorism, disorder and insurgency, fuelled by perceived or actual grievances. There is likely to be an increased sponsorship of irregular activity by states, seeking to utilise and exploit, through proxies, gaps in the international system, either to assert themselves or to secure advantage without exposing themselves to state-on-state risks. Acts of extreme violence, including mass casualty attacks, will continue to be used by groups with sophisticated networks and the ability to exploit the media in order to maximise the impact of the ‘theatre of violence’.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
United States Transition
The status, culture and actions of the US will have a decisive effect on the evolution of the international system, as it adjusts to an uneven, possibly unbalanced transition from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
The Rising Powers
China’s economic development will be one of the most significant factors in the future of the globalised economy. Other growing, or resurgent powers are likely to be of influence, with Brazil and possibly South Africa strengthening their status as regional powers.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
Weak States
Many states and some regions will fail to attain the necessary level of economic and political development to compete in a sustained and successful manner in the global economy. These states are likely to be beset by a mixture of environmental, demographic, economic and political pressures with consequent impact on their stability and security. They can be regarded as weak states. Some weak states may fail completely, with sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, regions of global concern. The degree to which weak states impact on others is likely to depend on the security of supply of strategic resources to the globalised economy and whether internal instability spreads to neighbours, either through migration or conflict. Responses to weak states are likely to include humanitarian assistance, containment and stabilisation.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
Ungoverned Space
Some geographical regions, including weak states and rapidly growing cities, will not be subject to legal, legitimate or conventional administration. Where this occurs, power is likely to be wielded by groups ranging from warlords and armed criminal gangs through to traditional tribal or religious structures. Each region will be unique and engagement by outside powers will require an understanding of the individual context of the region. Some of these regions are likely to subsist through illicit trade and institutionalised criminal activity, while others will be ineffective in curbing instability. Many are likely to suffer conflict and be a source of instability in neighbouring regions. The risks associated with these spaces, including endemic criminal activity, the basing of terrorists, irregular activity and conflict, are likely to increase and add to the burdens of maintaining the integrity of the international system. Similarly, states that are unwilling or unable to invest sufficiently in maritime security, are unlikely to be able to patrol and enforce their jurisdiction and internationally binding maritime obligations in their territorial seas and economic zones. This may lead to activity stretching from maritime pollution, dumping of hazardous materials, illegal fishing, smuggling (of drugs, people and other forms of contraband) up to piracy attacks. This will be particularly important when an area of sea adjacent to a weak state encompasses key communication nodes, such as the Straits of Malacca or the Bab-el-Mandeb.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Access to technology that enables the production and distribution of WMD is likely to increase. Many states will feel that they require the prestige and deterrent value of WMD systems to reinforce their regional power.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence
Non-State Actors
MNCs, large non-governmental organisations, as well as organised criminal groups, all work across the global stage. However, the authority of the state is likely to remain dominant. Non-State Actors are only likely to gain a similar degree of influence in areas where governance has broken down or is particularly fragile. Large MNCs, such as Gazprom, are increasingly state-owned and controlled, and other large corporations will have to work within the state based legislative framework if they are to gain access to resources and markets. While media and communication corporations may become ubiquitous global brands, the control by the state of the physical environment and operating space mean that it is unlikely that these corporations will have the means, methods or opportunities to usurp the power of the state. Non-governmental organisations, especially those associated with particular interests, will play niche roles and have influence within liberal democracies, but it is unlikely that their approaches of utilising the media, direct action and lobbying will have much impact on more authoritarian states.
2010
Global strategic trends - out to 2040
UK, Ministry of Defence